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Article 
FROM SELF-DETERMINATION TO SELF-
DOMINATION:  NATIVE AMERICANS, 
WESTERN CULTURE, AND THE PROMISE OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL-BASED REFORM  
Joshua Fershee* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The “Indian Problem” or “Aboriginal Problem” is a deeply ingrained 
part of American culture.1  It is worth noting what should be obvious:  
“Indian Problem” is itself a loaded phrase.  Written from a Canadian 
perspective, this reality is aptly explained as follows:   
Identifying [the problem] as an Aboriginal problem 
inevitably places the onus on Aboriginal people to desist 
from “troublesome behaviour.” It is an assimilationist 
approach, the kind that has been attempted repeatedly 
in the past, seeking to eradicate Aboriginal language, 
culture and political institutions from the face of Canada 
and to absorb Aboriginal people into the body politic—
                                                 
* Associate, Davis Polk & Wardwell, New York, NY.  J.D. 2003, Tulane Law School; B.A. 
1995, Michigan State University.  Editor in Chief, Tulane Law Review, Volume 77 (2002-03).  
This Article expresses only my opinions, and I am solely responsible for the contents.  This 
Article would not have been possible without the encouragement, love, and support of my 
wonderful wife, Kendra Jean Huard Fershee, who has shown me anything is possible.  I 
love you more each and every day.  Special thanks also to the editors of the Valparaiso 
University Law Review, whose time and effort have made this Article the best it could be. 
1 The terms “Indian,” “Native American,” “Aboriginal,” and “Indigenous” are used 
throughout this Article and the attempt has been made to use them appropriately.  
Recognizing the significant cultural sensitivities related to defining any culture, but 
especially in this context, the author apologizes in advance for causing any offense. 
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so that there are no discernible Aboriginal people and 
thus, no Aboriginal problem.2  
It appears that the problem is such a part of our culture that we are 
as reluctant as we are unable to see it solved.  The U.S. government 
recognized that there was a problem from the earliest moments of the 
country’s founding.  The issue continued through the Civil War, where 
Native Americans were recognized as requiring specific delineation in 
the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment.3  Additionally, since 1824, 
the United States has had an agency dedicated specifically to dealing 
with Native American issues—the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”).  
Furthermore, Native Americans are owed millions of dollars, but the 
money sits, somewhere, doing nothing to promote the welfare of its 
rightful owners.  Native Americans today continue to be among the 
poorest, most unhealthy, and least educated people in the United States.4  
They are probably the least respected as well.   
Despite repeated pleas for change, Native Americans still see 
purported names, symbols, and images of their cultures co-opted for the 
profit and exploitation of the white majority.5  Chief Wahoo,6 the 
Washington Redskins, and the Jeep Grand Cherokee provide just a few 
examples.  The American public has seen fit to provide little, if any, 
disincentive to cease the exploitation of Native Americans. 
By comparison, consider the same issues as they relate to African-
Americans.  Race issues continue to be a major problem in the United 
                                                 
2 ROYAL COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES:  INTERPRETING THE MANDATE, available at 
http://www.ubcic.bc.ca/RCAP.htm (last visited July 6, 2004). 
3 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  Native Americans are mentioned twice in the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Id.  The first such mention is a tacit reference: “All persons born or 
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction therof, are citizens of the 
United States and of the State wherein they reside.”  Id. § 1 (emphasis added).  The second 
reference excluded “Indians not taxed” when apportioning representatives.  Id.  § 2. 
4 See, e.g.,  Nancy A. Denton, Racial Identity and Census Categories:  Can Incorrect 
Categories Yield Correct Information?, 15 LAW & INEQ. 83, 86 n.17 (1997) (stating that Native 
Americans have three times the unemployment rate of white people, earn less than white 
men at all education levels, and have “the highest poverty rate for individuals and families 
of any group, and their child poverty rate is second only to that of African-Americans”); 
Scott R. Rosner, Legal Approaches to the Use of Native American Logos and Symbols in Sports, 1 
VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 258, 261 (2002) (“Pervasive problems in the Native American 
community include poverty, education, housing, and health care, as well as numerous 
other related social ills.”). 
5 See Ward Churchill, Let’s Spread the “Fun” Around, in WARD CHURCHILL, INDIANS ARE 
US?:  CULTURE AND GENOCIDE IN NATIVE NORTH AMERICA 65-66 (Ward Churchill ed., 1994). 
6 Chief Wahoo is the mascot of the Cleveland Indians baseball team. 
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States, but significant strides have been made in the past forty years.  It is 
easy for some to forget that less than four decades ago it was legal to 
refuse public accommodations to a person because of his skin color.7  
Before the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it was legal, and common practice, to 
restrict access to restaurants, jobs, and medical care.8  This progress does 
not indicate the completion of the task, but merely a step in the right 
direction.  “Equality” is still far from the norm, but real changes have 
been made for minorities in the United States, especially African-
Americans.  These changes have not just been legal, but also cultural. 
As it should be, it is no longer acceptable (and there are 
consequences) for a professional sports executive to say publicly that 
African-Americans are not Major League managers because they are 
inherently unable to do the job.9  Implying that things would have been 
better in America had a racist regime taken control of the White House 
cost a U.S. Senator his job as Senate Majority Leader.10  And “putting on 
blackface,” once a common practice for actors and comedians,11 is almost 
completely taboo, even, apparently, with the blessing of an African-
American.12  But when Native Americans request a change,13 there is 
                                                 
7 See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964) (upholding the 
constitutionality of the public accommodations provision of Title II of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964). 
8 See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law:  Federal Antidiscrimination 
Legislation after Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 447 (2000) (describing the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 as a “momentous event” in the history of federal antidiscrimination 
law). 
9 See Diane Pucin, Umpire Should Get the Thumb, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2003, pt. 4, at 1, 
available at 2003 WL 2383022  (recounting that “[w]hen former Dodger general manager Al 
Campanis said on national television in 1987 that blacks lacked ‘the necessities’ to be 
baseball managers and executives, he almost immediately lost his job” despite the fact that, 
“he was largely responsible for finding and signing minority players . . . and had, by all 
accounts, treated men and women of all races fairly”). 
10 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, For Lott, Uneasy Role as One of 100 in Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 
2003, at A1 (reporting that Senator Lott lost his job as Senate Majority leader over the 
controversy from his “comments that the nation would have been better off had Mr. 
[Strom] Thurmond, who ran for president in 1948 as a segregationist, been elected”). 
11 See David Nicholson, Getting Beneath Blackface, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 1998, at D2, 
available at 1998 WL 2473540. 
12 See Kenneth Turan, “Get Bruce”:  Story Behind the Fine Lines, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Sept. 17, 
1999, at B7, available at 1999 WL 8190710 (stating that Whoopi Goldberg requested that 
Bruce Vilanch write then-boyfriend Ted Danson’s now infamous blackface appearance at 
the Friar’s Club). 
13 See Jeff Dolley, The Four R’s:  Use of Indian Mascots in Educational Facilities, 32 J.L. & 
EDUC. 21, 21-23 (2003).  Dolley states: 
Native Americans and others have sought to terminate the use of 
Indian mascots in a number of ways.  They have sought remedies 
against Indian-mascoted schools and sports teams in courts of law; 
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little public outcry.  Chief Wahoo is probably the most racist caricature 
still used as a major promotional image.  The functional equivalent to 
“Sambo” for African-Americans, the image is still often claimed 
somehow to honor Indians.14  The Washington Redskins continue to be 
called the Redskins, though it is painfully obvious how absurd and 
offensive a similar team called the “Darkies” or the “Blackskins” would 
be.15  The most distressing part of all of this is that many people seem to 
understand that these things are offensive, yet their use continues.16  
In seeking to address the legal and cultural issues facing Native 
Americans, there are several sources from which to draw potential 
solutions.  There is much to be learned from the experiences of other 
countries that have dealt with, and are dealing with, similar issues.  This 
Article will consider three separate experiences and attempt to 
synthesize their teachings for application in the United States.  The 
second Part of the Article will provide a synopsis of the problems and 
issues facing Native Americans.17  Part III of this Article will consider 
Canada, which has already made some reforms and policy shifts with 
respect to indigenous peoples.18  This Part will provide an overview of 
the recommendations of Canada’s Royal Commission on Aboriginal 
People.19  More specifically, it will review six “conditions for successful 
constitutional reform” and will argue that these conditions apply equally 
to any similar U.S. initiative.20  Part IV of the Article will look to 
Scotland, which recently made reforms to deal with historical 
multiethnic governance problems.21  Though not specifically dealing 
                                                                                                             
they have demonstrated against the use of such mascots; and they 
have petitioned teams to stop misappropriating their names through 
inaccurate logos and mascot décor and behavior. 
Id. at 22-23 (footnotes omitted). 
14 See Churchill, supra note 5, at 66-68 (stating that to “honor” African-Americans in the 
same way Native Americans have been honored, a baseball team called the “Sambos” 
should be created). 
15 See id. at 67-68. 
16 It would be hard not to know that Native Americans find them offensive.  There have 
been several demonstrations and requests for change, such as the clash between protesters 
and supporters at a November 15, 1992, football game between the Washington Redskins 
and the Kansas City Chiefs.  Id. at 66.  Furthermore, several athletics teams, primarily in the 
college ranks, have changed their names.  For instance, the St. John’s College sports teams 
were the “Redmen” and are now the “Red Storm,” and the Miami University of Ohio 
“Redskins” are now the “RedHawks.” 
17 See infra Part II. 
18 See infra Part III. 
19 See infra Part III. 
20 See infra Part III. 
21 See infra Part IV. 
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with indigenous peoples, the Scottish experience provides some 
interesting options for consideration.  Australia will be the focus of 
Part V; Australia has been considering a redrafting of its constitution for 
some time.22  One of the major issues, though, has been how to address 
the rights of and obligations to the aboriginal tribes.  Finally, Part VI will 
attempt to combine that which has been learned from past U.S. policies 
with the experiences of Canada, Scotland, and Australia to propose a 
change in the legal landscape as it applies to Native Americans.23  Such a 
change will require a change in the collective legislative and judicial 
mindset.  To have even a chance to resolve some of the current issues 
facing Native Americans, proposed solutions should be based on a 
concept of self-domination, instead of self-determination.  Self-
domination is a concept designed to override and move beyond the Self-
Determination Era, an era that has failed in its most fundamental, if well-
meaning, goals.   
II.  THE INDIAN PROBLEM 
We did not ask you white men to come here. The Great Spirit 
gave us this country as a home. You had yours. We did not 
interfere with you.  The Great Spirit gave us plenty of land to 
live on, and buffalo, deer, antelope and other game.  But you 
have come here; you are taking my land from me; you are 
killing off our game, so it is hard for us to live.24 
        -Crazy Horse (Lakota) 
Since the earliest days of the white man’s arrival in North America, 
the native peoples have been struggling to retain what is rightfully 
theirs.  Whether it is their land, their resources, or their culture, Native 
Americans have had to fight for just about everything.   
A. Native American Legal History:  Whose Version?  
Native American legal history is often divided into “eras,” which 
underscore the government’s Indian policy of the time.  The primary 
eras are the Removal Era, the Reservation Era, the Allotment and 
Assimilation Era, the Reorganization Era, the Termination Era, and  the 
                                                 
22 See infra Part V. 
23 See infra Part VI. 
24 PETER MATTHIESSEN, IN THE SPIRIT OF CRAZY HORSE (Penguin Books 1992) (1983) 
(quoting Crazy Horse). 
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Self-Determination Era.25  Traditional scholars of Indian Law often 
analyze these eras as “good” or “bad” periods when describing the 
evolution of Native American legal rights.26  Professor Robert A. 
Williams, Jr., argues that this view of Native American legal history is 
lacking because “there are never any Indians in the story of Indian rights 
[that] traditional scholars tell.”27  Professor Williams calls this “the White 
Man’s Indian Law,” which he says is problematic because it teaches that 
Indian struggles that ultimately led to United States Supreme Court 
decisions or congressional legislation were fought only by non-Indians.28  
He is undoubtedly correct when looking at the historical implications of 
how Indian Law has evolved.  However, the traditional scholarly view of 
Indian Law still provides a helpful starting point from which to analyze 
the issues facing Native Americans today because the problem was 
largely created by the white majority and, at least to some degree, must 
be solved within the framework still controlled by the same.   
From the early Supreme Court cases that defined Native American 
rights, the Cherokee Cases, Indians have been treated as wards of the state, 
with the U.S. government serving as the “guardians.”29  Chief Justice 
John Marshall also established early on that Congress, through the 
Constitution, has plenary power to regulate Indian affairs.30  This 
plenary power, apparently granted through the Indian Commerce 
Clause,31 provides Congress the power “to regulate Commerce . . . with 
the Indian Tribes.”32  It is this lurking power, regardless of what policy 
towards Native Americans is in vogue, that necessitates the development 
of solutions from within the framework of the traditional system and 
possibly changes to the Constitution itself.   
                                                 
25 See DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, at xv (4th ed. 1998). 
26 See Robert A. Williams, Jr., “The People of the States Where They Are found Are Often Their 
Deadliest Enemies”:  The Indian Side of the Story of Indian Rights and Federalism, 38 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 981, 983-84 (1996). 
27 Id. at 984 (recounting the comments of Vine Deloria, Jr.). 
28 Id. at 985. 
29 See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831); Williams, supra note 26, at 
981 (“[N]o theme recurs with more urgency or consistency in the history of Federal Indian 
Law than the federal government’s legal duty to protect Indians from the white racial 
power and hostility organized by states in our federal system of government.”). 
30 See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 18. 
31 See id. 
32 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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 The problems of this lurking power can be seen in eras such as the 
Allotment and Assimilation Era.33  By passing the Allotment Act of 
1887,34 Congress created a way to provide white people easier access to 
Indian lands, particularly in the western states.35  The Act provided that 
the President of the United States could, “[i]n all cases where any tribe or 
band of Indians has been or shall be located upon any reservation,” 
order the land “to be surveyed or resurveyed whenever in his opinion 
such reservation or any part may be advantageously utilized for 
agricultural or grazing purposes by such Indians” and allotted to “each 
Indian located thereon . . . for [his] best interest.”36  This allotment, 
placing ownership of the reservation in the hands of individuals instead 
of the group, paved the way for white people to take over large parcels 
of Indian-held land.37  Furthermore, it created “surplus lands” that 
remained after allotment.38  These surplus lands were naturally made 
available to white settlers.39  Congress was thus able to override, or at a 
minimum modify, reservations created by treaty, law, or executive order, 
without any regard for the opinions of those affected the most.40 
Other eras have seen equally appalling results.  For instance, in the 
Removal Era, the President was granted the power to move Native 
Americans to lands west of the Mississippi River.41  In 1836, against their 
will, thousands of Creek Indians were moved from Alabama to 
Oklahoma and left with virtually nothing.42  In the Termination Era, 
governmental policy moved toward total integration of Native 
Americans.43  This era saw the termination of 109 tribes and bands.44  
                                                 
33 See GETCHES, supra note 25, at 141 (listing the Allotment & Assimilation Era as running 
from 1871-1928). 
34 Indian General Allotment Act, ch. 119, § 1, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 
25 U.S.C. § 331 (1994)) (repealed 2000). 
35 See Williams, supra note 26, at 984. 
36 25 U.S.C. § 331 (2000). 
37 See Yuanchung Lee, Rediscovering the Constitutional Lineage of Federal Indian Law, 27 
N.M. L. REV. 273, 282 n.46 (1997) (stating that there was widespread sentiment “that 
individual ownership of property was a prerequisite to the . . . civilizing [of] the Indians”). 
38 See Adrian N. Hansen, Note, The Endangered Species Act and the Extinction of Reserved 
Indian Water Rights on the San Juan River, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 1305, 1317 n.91 (1995)  (“The 
Dawes Act termed lands not allotted to individual Indians as ‘surplus’ and therefore open 
for homesteading and purchase.”). 
39 Williams, supra note 26, at 984. 
40 See 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1994). 
41 See Act of May 28, 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411, 411. 
42 ANGIE DEBO, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES 103 (1970). 
43 See GETCHES, supra note 25, at 204. 
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These examples provide just a minuscule snapshot of the U.S. 
government’s well-chronicled maltreatment of Native Americans.45 
B. The Self-Determination Era:  History Repeats Itself 
The current era, Self-Determination, has been in place since 1961.46  
The concept behind self-determination has been described as comprising 
a collection of norms that “include rights to cultural integrity, use of 
lands and natural resources, social welfare and development, self-
government, and freedom from discrimination.”47  While this era is more 
“pro-Indian” than others, especially the Termination or Relocation Eras, 
case law and government practices indicate limited movement toward 
any true policy of self-determination.  In fact, “[t]he Supreme Court has 
become more hostile to Native American interests in its resolution of 
issues of tribal self-determination, highlighting the dearth of secure 
footholds in judicial doctrine for Native American law.”48  The current 
judicial doctrines that courts apply in cases where tribal sovereignty is at 
issue do not take the Native American perspective into account.49   
Indicative of policy failures in this area is the current state of affairs 
related to the individual Indian money trust accounts (“IIM trust” or 
“trust”).  The U.S. government, through the BIA, owes Native Americans 
millions of dollars that it is holding as the guardian of the trust.50  The 
trust has been managed so poorly that millions of dollars are missing.51  
                                                                                                             
44 See Kevin J. Worthen, Sword or Shield: The Past and Future Impact of Western Legal 
Thought on American Indian Sovereignty, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1372, 1381 n.40 (1991) (reviewing 
ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT). 
45 See, e.g., CHURCHILL, supra note 5; JOHN G. NEIHARDT, BLACK ELK SPEAKS (University 
of Nebraska Press 1995) (1932). 
46 See GETCHES, supra note 25, at xv. 
47 Note, International Law as an Interpretive Force in Federal Indian Law, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
1751, 1757-58 (2003). 
48 Note, Intergovernmental Compacts in Native American Law: Models for Expanded Usage, 
112 HARV. L. REV. 922, 922 (1999); cf. Note, supra note 47 (“Although the political branches 
have recently adopted policies that favor Indian tribal self-determination, the judicial 
doctrines defining the extent of inherent tribal sovereignty and the federal government’s 
power over tribes remain severe obstacles for tribes seeking to govern themselves and 
maintain their cultural integrity.”) (footnotes omitted). 
49 See id. (citing, inter alia, Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law:  The 
Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man’s Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. 
L. REV. 219, 258-89). 
50 See Cobell v. Babbitt, 30 F. Supp. 2d 24, 28 (D.D.C. 1998) (stating that there are as 
many as three hundred thousand individual IIM accounts totaling as much as four 
hundred fifty million dollars). 
51 Douglas R. Nash & Christopher P. Graham, Cobell v. Norton—Indian Trust Fund 
Management Litigation Takes Center Stage, ADVOCATE, Mar. 2003, at 15 (stating that the IIM 
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To force a better accounting, a number of Native Americans filed class 
action lawsuits against the United States.52  The failures of the U.S. 
government have been shown throughout these cases.  The government 
has proven completely ineffective even under the watch of the courts.  
Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt was even held in contempt for his 
role in the continued inadequacy.53  These repeated failures make clear 
the need for a new plan and a new way of thinking if Native Americans 
are to have the tools to reverse the centuries-long cycle of poverty and 
despair.   
III.  NORTH OF THE BORDER:  THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE 
In 1992, the Canadian government set forth the Royal Commission 
on Aboriginal Peoples (“Commission”) to analyze and explore options 
regarding constitutional reform proposals “as they related to Aboriginal 
self-government.”54  The goals of the Commission were to avoid an 
impasse in the process and to provide a basis for common understanding 
of the issues involved in any constitutional reforms.55  While the 
Canadian Constitution in 1992 already had some provisions that make 
the debate different from that in the United States,56 there are significant 
                                                                                                             
trust law suits were initiated “on behalf of all present and past individual trust 
beneficiaries against the United States for failure to properly manage trust assets”). 
52 See, e.g., Cobell, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 28. 
53 Cobell v. Babbitt, 37 F. Supp. 2d 6, 39 (D.D.C. 1999).  During the contempt trial, it 
became clear that 162 boxes of relevant documents had been destroyed by the Treasury 
Department.  Nash & Graham, supra note 51.  The Departments of Interior and Treasury 
had to pay six hundred thousand dollars in penalties.  Id.  The Treasury Department 
continued its inadequacy, reporting in 2000 that more Indian trust documents had been 
destroyed.  Id. 
54 ROYAL COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, THE RIGHT OF ABORIGINAL SELF-
GOVERNMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION: A COMMENTARY preface (1992), available at 
http://www.ubcic.bc.ca/docs/Aboriginal_Self-Government.doc (last visited July 6, 2004).  
In the terms of reference, the Commission’s mandate described: 
The Commission of Inquiry should investigate the evolution of the 
relationship among aboriginal peoples (Indian, Inuit and Metis), the 
Canadian government, and Canadian society as a whole.  It should 
propose specific solutions, rooted in domestic and international 
experience, to the problems which have plagued those relationships 
and which confront aboriginal peoples today.  The Commission should 
examine all issues which it deems to be relevant to any or all of the 
aboriginal peoples of Canada, and in particular, should investigate and 
make concrete recommendations . . . . 
Id. at app., Sched. I. 
55 Id. at Introduction. 
56 See CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) §§ 25, 35, 37; ROYAL COMMISSION ON 
ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, supra note 54, at Introduction, pt. 1. 
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overlaps between Canadian and American experiences with native 
peoples.  The Commission promoted six “conditions for successful 
constitutional reform” that provide a solid foundation upon which to 
build.57   
First, the Commission stated, “it is essential that the right of self-
government be explicitly identified in the Constitution as inherent in 
nature.”58  This principle is at the core of Aboriginal rights, and it is 
necessary to identify the source and the nature of those rights.  The 
Commission recognized the competing view that “Aboriginal people 
have no rights of government except those that the Federal and 
Provincial governments are prepared to bestow upon them.”59  This view 
is consistent with many U.S. cases, which followed the traditional 
discovery doctrine view that all rights flow from the government 
(originally the King).60  Yet the Commission determined that the 
preferable view was that indigenous peoples are the “heirs to ancient 
and enduring powers of government that they brought with them into 
the Confederation and still retain today.”61   
In particular, the Commission believed that the identification of the 
right to self-government as inherent would provide significant benefits 
as applied by the courts.  The Commission argued that there were 
“important practical implications” found in the term “inherent”:  “By 
clearly identifying the source and nature of the right, it gives courts and 
other interested parties a strong mandate to implement the right and 
significant guidance how to interpret it.”62  This identification of rights 
would limit the role of governmental intent in interpretation and instead 
return the focus to the traditional and contemporary views of the native 
peoples themselves.63  The added benefit, recognizing the great diversity 
                                                 
57 ROYAL COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, supra note 54, at Introduction, pt. 2.C. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 See, e.g., Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543, 573 (1823) (“This principle was, 
that discovery gave title to the government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, it 
was made, against all other European governments, which title might be consummated by 
possession.”).  But see Steven T. Newcomb, The Evidence of Christian Nationalism in Federal 
Indian Law: The Doctrine of Discovery, Johnson v. McIntosh, and Plenary Power, 20 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 303, 325 (1993) (arguing that plenary power and the United States’ 
“absolute property rights” over Native American lands are religiously based concepts). 
61 See ROYAL COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, supra note 54, at Introduction, pt. 
2.C.  Under this view, inherent rights are recognized in written documents like treaties and 
constitutions, but the source of the rights is the Aboriginal nation itself.  Id. 
62 Id. 
63 See id. 
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among native peoples, is that “the right may well assume different 
shapes in the various Aboriginal nations.”64  Such a benefit should not be 
overlooked.  Indigenous peoples have been treated consistently as 
though their worldviews and histories are one and the same; this could 
not be further from the truth.65  Providing a mechanism for courts and 
other entities to apply nation-specific rights would be a tremendous step 
forward in the treatment of indigenous peoples.66  
Next, the Commission advocated the recognition of the scope of the 
inherent right as “circumscribed rather than uncircumscribed.”67  This 
recognition would allow Aboriginal governments to coexist under the 
Constitution with the federal and local governments, all of which hold 
limited powers as defined by the Constitution.68  Otherwise, the 
Commission recognized, Aboriginal governments would hold unlimited 
powers in all areas, including international relations and defense.69  
While failing to provide complete autonomy, describing the inherent 
rights as circumscribed provides a political and practical solution to the 
reality of the situation. 
Third, the Commission advocated clear, though limited, sovereignty, 
allowing certain Aboriginal laws to take precedent over the laws of other 
governmental entities.70  In some situations, Aboriginal laws would hold 
exclusive province; in other areas, federal or provincial laws would share 
overlapping jurisdiction.71  This is not a new concept for Canadians or 
Americans because of their federal systems of government.72  
Fourth, and perhaps most important, the Commission stated that 
any constitutional reform related to Aboriginal peoples must have “the 
full involvement and consent of the Aboriginal peoples.”73  The 
                                                 
64 Id. 
65 See Ward Churchill, Naming our Destiny, in CHURCHILL, supra note 5, at 291, 299-306 
(describing Indian nations as having distinct and separate identities). 
66 In the United States, of course, there would likely be an Equal Protection Clause 
limitation on those “different rights” that could be recognized. 






73 Id.  This is a laudable goal, though perhaps a bit unrealistic.  Getting consensus from 
any group of people is rare, and, as recognized earlier, the diverse set of beliefs and goals 
of the various native groups would likely make consensus impossible.  Nonetheless, the 
underlying motivation behind this recommendation is right on point. 
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Commission recognized “many regrettable instances” relating to 
changes in the rights and powers of Aboriginal peoples that proceeded 
without their consent or participation and often directly contrary to their 
expressed desires.74  “This high-handed, unilateral approach is out of 
keeping with the basic constitutional relationship between Aboriginal 
nations and the Crown and departs from the consensual approach 
reflected, however imperfectly, in the numerous treaties concluded 
between Aboriginal nations and the Crown.”75  
Fifth, the Commission advocated that any explicit recognition of the 
inherent right of self-government should not diminish any already 
existing rights.76  That is, any such new constitutional provision “should 
serve to enhance the rights already recognized.”77  The Canadian 
Supreme Court has supported a view of an Aboriginal right of self-
government,78 and section 35 of the Constitution Act of 1982 may already 
recognize and affirm such a right.79  The Commission thus recommended 
that any new initiative clearly support, and not undermine, this 
interpretation.80 
Lastly, the Commission stated that any new provision must be 
“justiciable as soon as it is passed, without a ‘transition period.’”81  This 
requirement necessarily follows from any constitutional recognition of 
an inherent right of self-government.82  Any “inherent” right should be 
available immediately.83  Furthermore, any delay in justiciability may 
provide less than what is already provided by section 35 of the Canada 
Constitution.84  Any delay would imply that such a right did not already 






79 See CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) § 25; ROYAL COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL 
PEOPLES, supra note 54, at Introduction, pt. 2.C. 
80 ROYAL COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, supra note 54, at Introduction, pt. 2.C. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. (“If the right of self-government is identified in the Constitution as inherent in its 
nature and origins, it is hard to see how its recognition in the courts can be delayed.”). 
84 See CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) § 35; ROYAL COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL 
PEOPLES, supra note 54, at Introduction, pt. 2.C. 
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exist, thus conflicting with criterion five of the Commission’s conditions 
for successful reform.85 
The Commission’s criteria provide a powerful starting point for any 
consideration of constitutional reform, especially in the United States.  
The recommendations are even more applicable because Canada’s 
federal system provides several similarities to the U.S. federal system as 
it relates to native peoples.  In Canada, the Commission’s 
recommendations have led to continued discourse on the issue but have 
not led to any changes to Canada’s constitution.  The Commission 
appears to represent a more dedicated governmental response to the 
issue and has provided clear, forward-looking recommendations,86 
though to date they have led to little progress.  However, the 
recommendations still provide a good place to start.87   
IV.  FEDERALISM & DEVOLUTION:  THE SCOTTISH SOLUTION 
A new kind of federalism is now in place in Great Britain, a 
significant portion of which involves Scottish devolution and the 
creation of a new Scottish Parliament.88  This new federalism, which 
Professor Colin Picker calls “graduated federalism,”89 provides an 
intriguing possibility for determining how to provide increased 
sovereignty for Native Americans, while working within the federal 
system created through the U.S. Constitution.  Furthermore, this Scottish 
solution provides an interesting perspective because of Britain’s lack of a 
written constitution,90 thus making such devolution an even more 
creative and unique approach.91  
                                                 
85 See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text; see also ROYAL COMMISSION ON 
ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, supra note 54, at Introduction, pt. 2.C (stating that “[t]his criterion 
follows directly from points already made”). 
86 See ROYAL COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, supra note 54, at Introduction, pt. 2.D 
(providing four options designed to clear some of “the obstacles to fruitful constitutional 
negotiations . . . [and] to smooth the path to further exchanges between the parties, not to 
usurp their rightful place at the negotiating table”). 
87 See id. 
88 Colin B. Picker, “A Light unto the Nations”—The New British Federalism, the Scottish 
Parliament, and Constitutional Lessons for Multiethnic States, 77 TUL. L. REV. 1, 7 (2002). 
89 Id.  (stating that while Britain does not have any single document that acts as its 
constitution, there is still, in some sense, a constitution). 
90 Id. 
91 VERNON BOGANDOR, DEVOLUTION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 1 (Christopher Butler et al. 
eds., 1999) (calling Scottish devolution the “most radical constitutional change” in Great 
Britain since 1832). 
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Beyond this, as a federal system, Britain, like Canada, offers 
structural parallels that can assist in the development of a plan for the 
United States.  One of the primary purposes of federalism is to balance 
the interests of majority and minority populations.92  Clearly, this goal 
has not always led to the protection of minority rights in the United 
States.93  But over time it has provided a framework within which to 
work.  Though certainly not a panacea, the potential benefits of 
federalism apply to Native Americans as much as they apply to the 
Scottish or, for that matter, to African-Americans.  As Professor Picker 
explains:  
The idea of balancing [majority and minority interests], 
as opposed to fully resolving, the desires of people 
through devices of federalism may be better thought of 
as “conflict management” as opposed to “conflict 
resolution.”  Though it should be noted that the 
“management” may serve only to postpone the 
inevitable escalation of the conflict, and may sometimes 
exacerbate the problem by encouraging other groups to 
agitate and, or in the alternative, seek separation.  
Federalism, as conflict management, has been used to 
deal with such conflict issues as, among others, religion, 
language, race, and culture.  By allowing greater local 
control, these disparate interests can be accommodated, 
yet still maintain the state, even while encouraging or 
allowing diversity.94  
For these reasons, the new Scottish system offers some useful 
options that should be considered when looking for solutions in the 
United States. 
Scottish devolution returned “Scottish representative democracy in 
part to where it stood almost three hundred years ago.”95  The British 
                                                 
92 Picker, supra note 88, at 73. 
93 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (providing the embodiment of the three-fifths 
compromise, which apportioned representatives and direct taxes based on the “whole 
Number of free Persons . . . [and] three-fifths of all other Persons [e.g., slaves]”); Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548-49 (1896) (establishing the “separate-but-equal rule”), overruled 
by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1959); JOSEPH J. ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTHERS 17 (2000) 
(stating that although slavery was “clearly incompatible with the principles of the 
American Revolution,” slavery was removed from the agenda at the Constitutional 
Convention because it “threatened to disrupt the fragile union just as it was congealing”). 
94 Picker, supra note 88, at 73-74 (footnotes omitted). 
95 Id. at 33. 
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Parliament still holds significant powers, but the new Scottish 
Parliament “harkens back” three hundred years “in spirit if not in 
effect.”96  This attempt to restore some form of self-control is what makes 
it such an intriguing example when considered as an option for Native 
Americans.  It is unquestionable that three hundred years ago Scotland 
was a sovereign in the Anglo-Saxon tradition; Native Americans of the 
same time had drastically different forms of government.  To some 
people this might indicate that the Scottish experience is inapposite in its 
application to Native Americans.  But what the system provides—a way 
of returning a level of sovereignty to an underrepresented people—is 
exactly what is needed for Native Americans in the United States.   
In 1997, after Tony Blair was elected British Prime Minister, 
devolution became an alternative for the Scots as an option via two 
referenda.97  The referenda garnered strong support among the Scottish 
people.98  This support led to the British Parliament’s passage of the 
Scotland Act of 1998 (“Scotland Act”), which created the Scottish 
Parliament.99   
One of the more significant powers the new Scottish Parliament 
enjoys is the power to tax.100  This taxing power provides a significant 
“measure of freedom for the Scottish Parliament” and was viewed as a 
critical part of the early devolution process.101  The revenue-generating 
power, while providing an additional freedom, also required that the 
Scottish voters agree to pay for some of their newly found freedom.102  
This is not to imply that Scotland is, in any way, a wholly-independent 
entity; there are significant restrictions on the powers of the Scottish 
Parliament.  For instance, the taxing power is limited to tax increases or 
decreases of three percent.103  This may lead to significant restrictions, 
and “it remains to be seen what will be the real financial impact on the 
                                                 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 42.  Two referenda were presented to the Scottish electorate.  Id. at 43.  The first 
asked whether the people wanted a separate parliament; the second whether that 
parliament should have the power to tax.  Id. at 43-44.  Both referenda passed with more 
than sixty percent of the vote.  See id. at 42 n.253. 
98 Id. 
99 Scotland Act, 1998, c. 46, § 1 (Eng.) (“There shall be a Scottish Parliament.”). 
100 Id. § 73. 
101 Picker, supra note 88, at 43. 
102 See id. at 44 (“[T]his was a case of asking the electorate whether they desired to pay 
more for real devolution, a perceived question of payment not normally put to the 
electorate (of course the vote was on the power to tax, not an actual tax increase itself).”). 
103 Scotland Act § 73. 
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Scottish Parliament’s ability to carry out its policies free from the 
budgetary constraints” of the British Parliament.104 
In addition, the Scottish Parliament lacks complete legislative 
sovereignty.105  The Scottish Parliament is an inferior legislative body to 
the British Parliament in Westminster.106  Though not directly analogous, 
this relationship is similar to that of the relationship between the U.S. 
government and the states.107  Interestingly, the limitation on the 
legislative competency of the Scottish Parliament is limited only to those 
areas specifically reserved to the British Parliament.108  Thus the Scottish 
Parliament retains residual powers; the “powers not reserved to 
Westminster are devolved to Scotland.”109 
When devolution was proposed, executive powers, along with 
legislative powers, were thought to be among the powers that needed to 
be devolved.110  The Scotland Act provided for a similar Scottish 
Executive to that of the British Parliament.111  The Scottish Executive is 
comprised of a Scottish First Minister, along with other ministers, all of 
whom are Members of Scottish Parliament (“MSPs”).112  The executive 
power is, in many ways, less independent than the legislative power, at 
least to the extent that many decisions, including who will ultimately 
lead the Executive, is not left in Scotland.113  For instance, the Queen 
appoints the First Minister from among the MSPs.114  Furthermore, the 
two leading judicial positions, Lord Advocate and Solicitor General, are 
                                                 
104 See Picker, supra note 88, at 44-45. 
105 Id. at 45. 
106 Scotland Act § 28; see also Picker, supra note 88, at 45. 
107 Picker, supra note 88, at 45 (comparing Scotland Act § 28 to the Supremacy Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution). 
108 See Scotland Act sched. 5. 
109 Picker, supra note 88, at 45-46.  The freedoms devolved to the Scottish Parliament 
provide an interesting contrast to the relationship between the U.S. government and the 
states.  Compare Scotland Act sched. 5 (specifically detailing areas exclusively reserved for 
the British Parliament), with U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States respectively, or to the people.”).  Yet, in some cases, the powers reserved by 
Westminster are similar to the those powers reserved “under the Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce Clauses of the Constitution and under the foreign affairs powers of the federal 
government.”  Picker, supra note 88, at 47 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8). 
110 Picker, supra note 88, at 49. 
111 Id. at 48-49. 
112 Scotland Act §§ 44-51; Picker, supra note 88, at 48. 
113 See Scotland Act §§ 44-51. 
114 Scotland Act §§ 45-46; see also Picker, supra note 88, at 49 (noting that the Queen 
appoints a First Minister “upon the nomination of the Parliament following a vote of the 
MSPs after an election or resignation or other vacancy”). 
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appointed by the Queen and, unlike the other members of the Scottish 
Executive, cannot be removed by the First Minister.115  “Only the Queen, 
and hence Westminster, may terminate their positions.”116 
Despite some clear limitations on sovereignty, in just a few years the 
Scottish Parliament has passed more than thirty laws, indicating that 
“Scottish representative democracy is alive and well and able to focus on 
‘Scottish solutions for Scotland.’“117  It remains to be seen whether the 
Scottish Parliament and Scottish Executive will be willing to lead 
independently on difficult issues, thus exposing themselves to inevitable 
backlash.118  But all early indications point to a willingness to embrace 
the newly devolved power for the benefit of the Scottish people.119 
V.  REWRITING HISTORY:  THE PROBLEMS OF A NEW AUSTRALIAN 
CONSTITUTION 
Australia’s history with its Aboriginal predecessors parallels that of 
the United States in many ways.  For instance, Australia has gone 
through policy periods that roughly mirror those of the U.S. 
government.120  In the colonial period, the Australian government 
followed a policy of eradication, which included “waterhole poisonings, 
shootings, massacres and other savagery.”121  The next era, well into the 
nineteenth century, involved a policy of protection.122  This era was 
influenced, in part, by a need for an inexpensive and available 
workforce.123   
Beginning around 1937, the Australian government adopted an 
assimilation policy, followed by an integration policy in the early 
1960s.124  Furthermore, the ability to vote in federal elections was not 
granted to the Aborigines until 1962; it was not until 1965 that all six 
Australian states granted franchise rights to all citizens, regardless of 
race.125  Finally, a policy of multiculturalism was adopted, politically and 
                                                 
115 Scotland Act § 48; Picker, supra note 88, at 50. 
116 Picker, supra note 88, at 50. 
117 Id. at 52-53. 
118 Id. at 52. 
119 Id. 
120 Rick Sarre, Critical Perspectives of Native People: The Imprisonment of Indigenous 
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legally, in the last fifteen years.126  The goals of this policy are self-
determination and self-management,127 similar to the stated goals of 
current U.S. policy. 
Yet the purported governmental policy does not appear to be the 
policy of the majority of Australians.  A referendum held to determine 
whether to recognize officially the status of the Aborigines as Australia’s 
“first people” was soundly defeated in 1999.128  The proposal, which 
garnered only forty percent of the vote, included adding a new preamble 
to Australia’s constitution.129  Interestingly, there is some sentiment that 
the Aborigines were not particularly fond of the preamble as 
presented.130  This sentiment is understandable.  In a press release, Prime 
Minister John Howard stated: “The legislation will contain a clause 
declaring that the preamble has no legal force or effect and cannot be 
invoked in the interpretation of the Commonwealth Constitution.”131  
                                                 
126 See Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act (1989) (Austl.), available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/aatsica1989478/ (last visited July 6, 
2004). 
127 See Sarre, supra note 120, at 168. 
128 Australia Rejects Republic, BBC NEWS (London), Nov. 6, 1999, at http://news.bbc.co. 
uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/507293.stm (last visited July 6, 2004). 
129 Id.  The proposed preamble read as follows:   
With hope in God, the Commonwealth of Australia is constituted as a 
democracy with a federal system of Government to serve the common 
good. We the Australian people commit ourselves to this Constitution. 
Proud that our national unity has been forged by Australians from 
many ancestries; never forgetting the sacrifices of all who defended 
our country and our liberty in time of war; upholding freedom, 
tolerance, individual dignity, and the rule of law; honouring 
Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders, the nation’s first people, for 
their deep kinship with their lands and for their ancient and 
continuing cultures which enrich the life of our country; recognising 
the national building contribution of generations of immigrants; 
mindful of our responsibility to protect our unique natural 
environment; supportive of achievement as well as equality of 
opportunity for all; and valuing independence as dearly as the national 
spirit which binds us together in both adversity and success. 
Id. 
130 No Official Recognition for Aborigines, BBC NEWS (London), Nov. 6, 1999, at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/507377.stm (last visited July 6, 2004).  
Kim Beazley, the Labor opposition leader stated the following: “None of the indigenous 
people it seemed to me particularly wanted the way in which they were referred to in the 
constitution.  So I doubt whether they’ll be feeling a deep sense of loss tonight.”  Id. 
131 Press Release, John Howard, Prime Minister of Australia, Preamble to the 
Constitution (Mar. 23, 1999), available at http://www.pm.gov.au/news/media_releases/ 
1999/preamble.htm (last visited July 6, 2004). 
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Apparently, despite indications to the contrary, there was some fear that 
the courts would use the preamble.132   
This referendum also included a vote on a separate issue:  Whether 
Australia would “break ties with the British monarchy and become a 
republic.”133  This kind of controversy is hard to imagine in the United 
States, given that U.S. independence began with a sudden break from 
British control.134  The concept of any British control, however small, is 
unthinkable to most Americans.135  It appears, though, that having a 
British Head of State is less offensive to the Australian people than 
allowing their parliament to choose their leader; the majority, it seems, 
prefers a direct election or no change at all.136   
On the other hand, the Australian constitutional amendment process 
is very similar to that of the United States in the sense that it is extremely 
difficult to change.137  The process requires a nationwide majority vote, 
along with a majority in four out of six states.138  Only eight of the forty-
four referenda have succeeded, none of which were on contentious 
issues.139  The defeat of the preamble was a lost opportunity “to define 
the nation as it recognised the contribution of immigrants, the sacrifices 
of soldiers, and the historical role of Aborigines in creating a free and 
                                                 
132 See ARTHUR TUCK, Republic or Constitutional Monarchy?, at http://www.angelfire.com/ 
id/ronajoyner/tuckvote.html#Offer (last visited July 6, 2004) (stating that, according to Sir 
Harry Gibbs, a retired Chief Justice of the High Court, the preamble would be used by the 
High Court and the United Nations “to undermine or destroy our system of land title in 
unforseen ways”). 
133 Australia Rejects Republic, supra note 128.  This proposal was defeated 54.22% to 
44.87%.  Id.  The proposal stated: 
Do you agree with “A proposed law to alter the constitution to 
establish the Commonwealth of Australia as a Republic with the 
Queen and Governor General being replaced by a President appointed 
by a two-thirds majority of members of the Commonwealth 
Parliament?” 
Id. 
134 See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 93, at 5 (“The creation of a separate American nation occurred 
suddenly rather than gradually, in revolutionary rather than evolutionary fashion . . . .”). 
135 See Seth Mydans, Sydney Journal; and Elizabeth Windsor Is Still the Strong Favorite, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 5, 1999, at A4 (“Now neither Britain nor the United States would think of 
having an Australian as head of state.”) (quoting Gerard Henderson, executive director the 
Sydney Institute). 
136 See id. (reporting that a minority of the Australian population are “monarchists,” but 
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tolerant democracy.”140  A similar opportunity is lost every day that the 
United States fails to recognize formally the wrongs perpetrated on 
Native Americans in the past and fails to act to improve the current 
treatment of Native Americans.  It is this lesson that we should take from 
the Australian experience.  If not, the consequences could be 
significant.141   
VI.  PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
A. The Need for a New Era 
In order to move forward, the time is right for a new approach to 
Native American policy, using new, if largely symbolic, language that 
embodies this policy shift and the dawn of a new era.  The new era 
would be called Self-Domination to highlight the need for Native 
Americans to control their future.  Domination, defined as the “exercise 
of preponderant, governing, or controlling influence,”142 is more 
appropriate than “determination” in describing what should be the 
policy goals of the courts and legislatures.  In many ways, any “new era” 
would be a largely semantic change, at least short of any new legislation 
or constitutional amendment.  But often a change in language can be a 
precursor to new legislation and judicial doctrines that will lead to real 
change for those affected.  At this point, it may be that a change in 
language is the first realistic step in the process of improving the 
autonomy of Native Americans.  
Furthermore, a new era is necessary because of the gross 
ineffectiveness of the Self-Determination Era.  This ineffectiveness, 
coupled with neglect and mismanagement by the government, is largely 
tied to a lack of sufficient Native American control over Native 
                                                 
140 See K.P. Waran, Link to the Monarchy at Stake, NEW STRAITS TIMES (Malay.), Nov. 6, 
1999, at 10 (providing the statements of Aden Ridgeway, Australia’s only Aboriginal 
politician).  But see id. (“Opponents of the preamble include several Aboriginal leaders who 
have called for stronger terms than ‘deep kinship’ to recognise Aboriginal ownership of the 
land.”). 
141 Cf. Kathy Marks, Aboriginal Protests May Turn Violent, Says Leader, INDEPENDENT 
(London), Sept. 8, 2000, at 14 (“In protest situations you are always going to have a volatile 
situation which may have the capacity to go out of control.”) (quoting Geoff Clark, 
chairman of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, Australia’s biggest 
indigenous body).  In no way is this meant to imply that a Native American riot is around 
the corner.  It is merely a recognition that the longer people live under the control of an 
unsympathetic government, the more likely violent confrontation is to occur. 
142 MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 344 (10th ed. 1996). 
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American affairs.143  Current policy gives Native Americans insufficient 
control, effectively limiting their ability to find lasting solutions.   
B. Judicial Doctrine 
Next, current judicial doctrine can promote a judicial change in 
attitude toward Native Americans.  This change in attitude should lead 
the courts to revisit some of the definitions and descriptions from cases 
in which decisions were made on highly biased and dubious grounds.   
For instance, Congress’s plenary power has been reduced somewhat 
over time144 through the courts’ application of the trust doctrine.145  At 
times, the trust doctrine has led to interpretations of treaties and statutes 
in ways favorable to Native Americans.146  “However, the modern Court 
relies less on the canons [of construction] and sometimes interprets old 
statutes and treaties according to perceptions of contemporaneous (and 
racist) government officials.”147  Furthermore, interpretations of old 
treaties and statutes using “contemporaneous views” invariably mean 
the views of the white-male majority of the time period, not of all the 
parties involved.148  For Native Americans, treaties were sacred, fulfilling 
“a divine command for all the peoples of the world to unite as one.”149  
For the “Indians of the Classical Era,” treaties were often about life and 
death, and they regarded treaties as such.  The goals of these Native 
Americans included the following:  ensuring a “lasting peace after the 
shedding of blood, quelling the desire for revenge, being assured that a 
military ally would respond quickly to a call for help,” and finding 
trustworthy trading partners.150  If courts are going to use the views of 
the original era to interpret old treaties, the entire picture must be 
considered.  Treaties are inherently two party documents; to look only at 
the judges or the generals or the Congress of the time leaves half of the 
story untold.  Native Americans deserve the benefit of their bargain. 
                                                 
143 See supra Part II.B. 
144 See Note, supra note 47, at 1753. 
145 See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 18 (1831) (providing an early 
example of the trust doctrine). 
146 See Note, supra note 47, at 1753-54 (citing Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77 
(1908); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1905); Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 
556, 570-72 (1883)). 
147 Id. at 1754. 
148 See Williams, supra note 26, at 991. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 992. 
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Additionally, international law doctrine should be considered when 
courts interpret laws or statutes pertaining to Native Americans.  The 
“international standard-setting process,” through which states draft 
international treaties and human rights agreements, can assist in 
determining congressional intent.151  For example, the U.S. government 
has participated in the process, worked with tribes in creating various 
documents, and expressed a commitment to Native American self-
determination.152  These should all be considerations when a court 
determines the rights of Native Americans.153   
C. Current Constitutional Options 
Third, the Constitution itself, especially the Indian Commerce Clause 
and the Fourteenth Amendment, can provide additional motivation to 
change judicial and legislative policy toward Native Americans.  Though 
it is not without controversy, it has been said, “Indian tribes, of course, 
constitute a third domestic sovereign entity recognized by, but 
predating, the U.S. Constitution.”154  This is probably correct.   
For example, from the outset, Justice John Marshall set limits on 
tribal sovereignty,155 but recognized Indian tribes as “domestic 
dependent nations.”156  For about “150 years, . . . the presumption 
remained that tribal sovereignty extended to all preexisting tribal 
powers, unless those powers were abrogated by federal treaty or 
statute.”157  Despite changes and reductions over the years in tribal 
sovereignty, the Supreme Court’s federal Indian law until the late 1970s 
still seemed to apply “a presumption in favor of tribal sovereignty.”158  
The courts should return to this presumption, returning to Native 
Americans some of the limited rights that were available in even less-
enlightened times. 
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D. The Amendment Option 
Finally, though obviously more academic than practical at this point, 
a constitutional amendment could promote Self-Domination and, 
hopefully, a more fruitful existence for Native Americans.  Such an 
amendment could be as simple as drafting language to define specific 
rights of Native Americans, thus dictating the approach the courts and 
legislature should take in setting policy.  This could lead to an 
amendment that would be arguably a tautology, much like the Tenth 
Amendment.159  However, given the continuing struggles and unique 
role of Native Americans in U.S. history, such an amendment would 
secure, in a small but significant way, recognition of North America’s 
indigenous peoples that has been severely lacking since before the 
drafting of the Constitution.  Any drafting of such language must 
involve Native Americans, as we have learned from the Australian 
experience160 and the Canadian Commission’s research.161 
Another issue of concern is the issue of sovereignty.  It has been long 
established, and regularly repeated, that Native American tribes are a 
sort of dependent sovereign.162  Native Americans “remain a ‘separate 
people, with the power of regulating their internal and social 
relations.’”163  Furthermore, “[t]hey have power to make their own 
substantive law in internal matters.”164  As discussed earlier, this is 
extremely misleading because Congress, at any time, has power over 
virtually all Native American rights.  “Supreme Court case law 
repeatedly creates and then recognizes the enormity of the ‘plenary’ 
federal power over the Indian tribes.”165  The Termination Era represents 
a good example of Congress exercising its power.  “Termination stands 
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as a chilling reminder to Indian peoples that Congress can unilaterally 
decide to extinguish the special status and rights of tribes without Indian 
consent and without even hearing Indian views.”166 
To have any sovereignty, some sovereignty must be guaranteed.  
The states, for instance, are often considered sovereigns of sorts, but 
under the Constitution, they are clearly subordinate to the federal 
government.167  Despite this subordinate relationship, the states do have 
some, albeit indirectly, recognized rights in the Constitution.  The Tenth 
Amendment states: “The powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States respectively, or to the people.”168  While this power is often 
recognized as a tautology, nonetheless, the mere existence of the Tenth 
Amendment provides for a certain amount of interpretive deference. 
Though not recently, the courts have applied the Tenth Amendment “to 
prove that states reserved all nondelegated powers.”169  Thus the Tenth 
Amendment is, if nothing else, a reminder that federal government 
power over the states was not meant to be absolute. 
Despite the difficulties in drafting and passing a constitutional 
amendment, the effort could be time well spent.  For one thing, 
generating a real and focused discourse about Native American rights 
has value.  Such a discourse has the potential to inspire, motivate, and 
reenergize a culture that has been long ignored.  It would also likely 
inflame and open old wounds, but that is part of the healing process.  By 
taking a close look at what rights should be guaranteed to those that 
occupied the land now known as the United States and attempting to 
guarantee such rights, the people of the United States would be taking a 
long overdue step toward formal recognition of the great cost that was 
borne by the Native Americans in the name of progress.  
To suggest exactly what kind of language should be used for such an 
amendment is premature.  The process must include Native peoples 
from a variety of backgrounds, historians to assist the majority in 
understanding what was already promised and never delivered, and 
politicians because this is inherently a political process.  The proposed 
language should create a clear place for Native Americans in the 
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Constitution, and thus in this country.  Some have argued that this 
already exists.  Professor Resnik has argued that “[t]he U.S. Constitution 
appears to recognize tribes as having a status outside its parameters, as 
entities free from the taxing powers of states and of the federal 
government and with whom the federal government shares commercial 
relations and makes treaties.”170  Some Native American legal scholars 
have argued that “the net result is constitutional recognition of a third 
domestic sovereign, while others describe the relationship as existing 
outside the Constitution.”171  Regardless, constitutional recognition of a 
“third domestic sovereign” by the founders has been ignored to the 
point that a constitutional amendment is necessary to reinforce and 
guarantee any rights that may or may not exist at this time.172 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
This Article has proposed the following changes to improve the 
ability of Native Americans to control their own destiny: a change in 
governmental and judicial policy from Self-Determination to Self-
Dominance; the use of judicial doctrine, including international law 
interpretations, to promote an increased recognition of tribal rights; a 
return to the early constitutional-based view of a presumption of tribal 
sovereignty; and the passage of a constitutional amendment to guarantee 
tribal rights and influence judicial interpretation of already existing 
rights.  These recommendations, all in some way linked to constitutional 
interpretation or change, will not make every Indian well-educated, 
well-fed, and independent.  They would not necessarily make any visible 
changes for generations, but that is to be expected.  Significant cultural 
change takes time. 
Before the white man landed on the shores of the so-called New 
World, Native Americans lived vibrant, if at times difficult, lives for 
centuries.  Unquestionably, the indigenous peoples were self-sufficient 
and independent.  While it seemed to happen quickly, the near-
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destruction of Native American culture took hundreds of years from the 
day Columbus first arrived.  It will take generations to rebuild any 
semblance of the autonomy that Native Americans once had. 
Native Americans are resilient.  They have survived, with at least 
part of their culture intact, through attempts to terminate their existence 
entirely.  It is time for the United States to open a dialogue and make 
some changes.  Most U.S. citizens recognize that Native Americans hold 
a unique place in the United States and the world; they recognize that 
Native Americans have suffered greatly in the development of the 
country.  The time has come for the people of the United States to 
recognize formally and explicitly the rightful place of this nation’s first 
inhabitants within the Constitution and to allow Native Americans the 
means to a continued and fruitful existence. 
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